Analytic philosophy

branch of philosophy concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science

20th-century tradition of Western philosophy

discipline of philosophy that deals with language and meaning

assertion that only statements verifiable through empirical observation are meaningful

branch of logic concerned with the study of propositions (whether they are true or false) that are formed by other propositions with the use of logical connectives, and how their value depends on the truth value of their components

thumb|René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this [[Digesting Duck.]]

thumb|upright=1.3|alt=Pair of black swans swimming|Here are two black swans, but even with no black swans, "All swans are white" would still be shown falsifiable by "Here is a black swan"—it would still be a valid observation statement in the empirical language, even if empirically false.

An intention is a mental state in which a person commits themselves to a course of action. Having the plan to visit the zoo tomorrow is an example of an intention. The action plan is the content of the intention while the commitment is the attitude towards this content. Other mental states can have action plans as their content, as when one admires a plan, but differ from intentions since they do not involve a practical commitment to realizing this plan. Successful intentions bring about the intended course of action while unsuccessful intentions fail to do so. Intentions, like many other ment

normative ethical theories

In metaphysics, phenomenalism is the view that physical objects cannot justifiably be said to exist as "things-in-themselves", but only as perceptual phenomena or sensory stimuli (e.g. redness, hardness, softness, sweetness, etc.) situated in time and in space. In particular, some forms of phenomenalism reduce all talk about physical objects in the external world to talk about bundles of sense data.

philosophy of mind that mental states are driven by their function

Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes. Hence, it is colloquially known as the hurrah/boo theory. Influenced by the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positivism in the 20th century, the theory was stated vividly by A. J. Ayer in his 1936 book Language, Truth and Logic, but its development owes more to C. L. Stevenson.

hypothetical internal cognitive symbol that represents external reality

view that philosophical problems are based in distortions of language

approach to Marxist theory that was prominent amongst English-speaking philosophers and social scientists during the 1980s

epistemological theory that the truth value of a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world and whether it accurately describes (corresponds with) that world

Verificationism, also known as the verification principle or the verifiability criterion of meaning, is a doctrine in philosophy which asserts that a statement is cognitively meaningful only if it is empirically verifiable (can be confirmed through experience) or an analytic truth (true by virtue of its definition or logical form). Typically expressed as a criterion of meaning, it rejects traditional statements of metaphysics, theology, ethics and aesthetics as meaningless in terms of conveying truth value or factual content, reducing them to emotive expressions or "pseudostatements" that are

semantic distinction, used primarily in philosophy to distinguish propositions (in particular, statements that are affirmative subject–predicate judgments) into two types: analytic propositions and synthetic propositions

Neurophilosophy, or the philosophy of neuroscience, is the interdisciplinary study of neuroscience and philosophy that explores the relevance of neuroscientific studies to the arguments traditionally categorized as philosophy of mind. Recent scientific discourse elucidates the distinction between "neurophilosophy" and "philosophy of neuroscience".

general term for techniques typically used by philosophers in the analytic tradition

group of things connected by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common to all of the things

theory in the philosophy of perception

philosophical theory which holds that all possible worlds exist, and the actuality of our world is purely indexical

in analytic philosophy, a distinction between using a word or phrase and mentioning it

In analytic philosophy, actualism is the view that everything there is (i.e., everything that has being, in the broadest sense) is actual. Another phrasing of the thesis is that the domain of unrestricted quantification ranges over all and only actual existents.

area of philosophy

Explication () is the process of drawing out the meaning of something that is not clearly defined, so as to make explicit what is currently left implicit. In other words, "to explicate a concept is, roughly, to replace it with a similar but more theoretically useful concept". The term explication is used in both analytic philosophy and literary criticism. German philosopher Rudolf Carnap was the first to coin the term in an analytic philosophical approach in his book Logical Foundations of Probability, while the term is supplanted with Gustave Lanson's idea of Explication de Texte when referri

Inductivism is the traditional and still commonplace philosophy of scientific method to develop scientific theories. Inductivism aims to neutrally observe a domain, infer laws from examined cases—hence, inductive reasoning—and thus objectively discover the sole naturally true theory of the observed.

form for logical arguments, obtained by abstracting from the subject matter of its content terms

line of philosophy

theory of jurisprudence

relation of resemblance between objects

Philosophical paradox by G. E. Moore

view on the purpose of philosophy

philosophical movement combining Thomism, and modern analytic philosophy

branch of metaphysics regarding abstract objects

philosophical argument put forward by British philosopher G. E. Moore, to refute the equating of the property of goodness with some non-moral property, X, whether naturalistic (e.g. pleasure) or supernatural

Proposed definitions of philosophy

debate between Frederick Copleston and Bertrand Russell

theory in philosophy of language

concept in metaphysics

society for collaboration among European philosophers