Mind–body problem

thumb|17th-century representation of consciousness by Robert Fludd, an English Paracelsian physician

open question in philosophy of how abstract minds interact with physical bodies

Intentionality is the mental ability to refer to or represent something. Sometimes regarded as the mark of the mental, it is found in mental states like perceptions, beliefs or desires. For example, the perception of a tree has intentionality because it represents a tree to the perceiver. A central issue for theories of intentionality has been the problem of intentional inexistence: to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states.

philosophy of mind that mental states are driven by their function

Epiphenomenalism is a philosophical theory on the mind–body problem in philosophy of mind. It holds that subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body, but do not themselves influence physical events. According to epiphenomenalism, the appearance that subjective mental states (such as thoughts and intentions) are causally effective themselves and directly influence physical events is an illusion generated by brain regions such as the prefrontal cortex, with consciousness itself being a by-product of

the problem of explaining how and why organisms have qualia or phenomenal experiences

interdisciplinary theory

inability to describe conscious experiences in soley physical or structural terms

bodily components, such as electrical signals, correlating to consciousness and thinking

thesis in philosophy of mind

something that happens in the mind, such as a thought

philosophical question