anti-realism
Sign in to saveIn analytic philosophy, anti-realism is the position that the truth of a statement rests on its demonstrability through internal logic mechanisms, such as the context principle or intuitionistic logic, in direct opposition to the realist notion that the truth of a statement rests on its correspondence to an external, independent reality. In anti-realism, this external reality is hypothetical and is not assumed.
~12 min read
Encyclopedic overview
13 sectionsContents
- Varieties
- Metaphysical anti-realism<!--'Metaphysical anti-realism' and 'Metaphysical antirealism' redirect here-->
- Mathematical anti-realism
- Counterarguments<!--'Realistic rationalism' redirects here-->
- Semantic anti-realism
- Scientific anti-realism<!--'Scientific anti-realism' and 'Scientific antirealism' redirect here-->
- Anti-representationalism
- Moral anti-realism
- Epistemic anti-realism
- See also
- References
- Bibliography
- External links
In analytic philosophy, anti-realism is the position that the truth of a statement rests on its demonstrability through internal logic mechanisms, such as the context principle or intuitionistic logic, in direct opposition to the realist notion that the truth of a statement rests on its correspondence to an external, independent reality. In anti-realism, this external reality is hypothetical and is not assumed.
There are many varieties of anti-realism, such as metaphysical, mathematical, semantic, scientific, moral and epistemic. The term was first articulated by British philosopher Michael Dummett in an argument against a form of realism Dummett saw as 'colorless reductionism'.
Excerpted from Wikipedia’s “anti-realism” article, available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 licence.