Person · Open Library
- Works
- 9
Top works
- Passion for Cooperation
- Evolution of Cooperation
- Harnessing Complexity
- Donnant, donnant
- Complexity of Cooperation : Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration, the
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Listeners · Last.fm
- Listeners
- 3
- Total plays
- 5
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Recent publications · Crossref
5 total works indexed
- Development of the Colle-Salvetti correlation-energy formula into a functional of the electron density
· 1988 · cited 95,788x
- Hallmarks of Cancer: The Next Generation
· 2011 · cited 56,560x
- Research electronic data capture (REDCap)—A metadata-driven methodology and workflow process for providing translational research informatics support
· 2009 · cited 46,839x
- Regression Shrinkage and Selection Via the Lasso
· 1996 · cited 39,802x
- The PHQ-9
· 2001 · cited 39,510x
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Quotes
- “In fact, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the strategy that works best depends directly on what strategy the other player is using and, in particular, on whether this strategy leaves room for the development of mutual cooperation. This principle is based on the weight of the next move relative to the current move being sufHciently large to make the future important.”
- “Proposition 1. If the discount parameter, w, is sufficiently high, there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player.”
- “What accounts for TIT FOR TAT's robust success is its combination of being nice, retaliatory, forgiving, and clear. Its niceness prevents it from getting into unnecessary trouble. Its retaliation discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is tried. Its forgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation. And its clarity makes it intelligible to the other player, thereby eliciting long-term cooperation.”
- “Proposition 2. TIT FOR TAT is collectively stable if and only if, w is large enough. This critical value of w is a function of the four payoff parameters, T; R, P, and S.”
- “Proposition 3. Any strategy which may be the first to cooperate can be collectively stable only when w is sufficiently large.”
- “Proposition 4. For a nice strategy to be collectively stable, it must be provoked by the very first defection of the other player.”
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