Baloch

Although Baluchis are fragmented politically, as well as by tribal and clan identities, they have several other factors placing them at risk for future rebellion: a history of political and economic discrimination as well as recent rebellious activity carried out by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). The transition from the Musharraf government in 2008 to a new government may change government relations with the Baluchis, but the instability of a democracy in transition may further put the group at risk. Furthermore, the continuation of violent conflict in Afghanistan adds to instability in Baluchistan and ensures a ready supply of cheap weaponry. Increasing Pashtun nationalism (which is responding to many of the same stimuli as Baluch nationalism) may also lead to tension between the Baluch and Pashtun residents of Baluchistan. The Baluchi, who speak Baluch and Brahui, (LANG = 1) are among the oldest inhabitants of the desert regions in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, first arriving to the region more than 1,000 years ago. Although their origins are debated, the myth most commonly invoked among the Baluch is that their ancestors migrated from Aleppo (in modern-day Syria) shortly before the time of Christ. They are traditionally nomads, and many still combine subsistence agriculture with semi-nomadic pastoralism (CUSTOM = 1). While Baluchis still hold a tenous majority in Baluchistan, only 56 percent of Pakistan's Baluch population resides there (GROUPCON = 2; GC2 = 1). Most are Sunni Muslims (RELIGS1 = 5). However, religious identity is not most Baluchis' primary identity. Instead, Baluchis generally base their identities on tribal, clan and sub-clan affiliations and loyalties to sardars, clan chiefs. Clan and sub-clan divisions have at times led to open intra-Baluch conflicts. Under British rule, Baluchis enjoyed widespread autonomy and were also granted autonomy when Pakistan initially gained independence. However, provincial autonomy was revoked in 1955, when several provinces were merged. Autonomy was restored in 1970, but the secessionist crisis of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), led Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to tighten central control. While a newly drafted constitution guaranteed minority rights, provincial autonomy existed merely on paper. Baluch nationalists, inflamed by the continued economic deprivation of the region and the revocation of traditional autonomy, rebelled against central control in 1973, when the Bhutto government dismissed the Baluchistan provincial government. (The government, which had just seized an illegal cache of weapons, claimed the provincial government encouraged violence and opposed modernization.) The uprising was not suppressed until 1977, when the Bhutto government was removed. Bhutto's successor, General Zia ul-Haq released as many as 11,000 Baluchi leaders and activists from jails and declared an amnesty for guerrillas who had fled to Iran or Afghanistan. During the imposition of martial law in Pakistan (1977-1985), Zia's government actively sought to promote solutions to economic and social programs in Baluchistan. Yet, despite some limited efforts by the Pakistani government, Baluchistan still remains the most economically disadvantaged province (ECDIS04-06 = 2). Further, Baluchis are underrepresented in the bureaucracy, armed forces, and government at both the provincial and national level (POLDIS04-06 = 2). While in 2003, a Baluch became prime minister, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, this probably does not indicate a general shift in the political realm for most Baluch, and indeed his assumption of power could be seen as more inspired by the necessities of the political game; the current Pakistani political scene will not allow him much freedom of action or independence. Furthermore, while provincial and national elections have taken place since 2001, they were viewed as deeply flawed by most ethnic groups in Pakistan, as well as by the international community. It is still unclear if the