Arabs

Arabs in Iran have three risk factors for rebellion, including persistent protest, territorial concentration and government repression. Furthermore, there are no factors present that typically inhibit rebellion, such as a democratic regime or transnational support for negotiation and accommodation of Arab grievances. With such a closed society, projecting the actual condition of Iranian Arabs is difficult. Nevertheless, as the presidency changed hands from the moderate President Khatami (1997-2005) to the hard-lined Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-present), the condition of Iranian Arabs has also worsened. As the Iranian government’s centralization policies remain stronger than ever, it appears unlikely that the Iranian Arab desire for a measure of autonomy will be recognized anytime soon. Hopes of moderate elements in Iran to hold off its sizable conservative challengers have faded, exacerbating risks to Iran’s Arabs. Arabs have been present in Iran dating back 12 centuries. The main factor that differentiates them from Iran's Persian speaking majority is their racial distinction, and that they speak one of several dialects of Arabic (LANG = 1). They live in the southern regions of Iran with the majority living in the province of Khuzestan while others live along the coast of the Persian Gulf; Iranian Arabs with close to 70% living in urban areas (GC119 = 4; GROUPCON = 2). Most of the Arabs living in Khuzestan are Shi'i Muslims, and most of those living along the coast of the Persian Gulf are Sunni Muslims (RELIGS1 = 6), with more Shi’a than Sunni overall. Both the urban and rural Arabs of Khuzestan are intermingled with the Persians, Turks and Lurs who also live in the province and often intermarry with them. Despite this, Iranian Arabs are regarded by themselves and by Iran's other ethnic groups as separate and distinct from non-Arabs. The government of Iraq, both before and after Iran's 1979 revolution, has accused Iran of discrimination against its Arab population. (Despite this, the Arab population of Khuzestan sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war). Outside of Khuzestan there is little ethnic solidarity among Iran's Arabs. The division between Shi'i and Sunni Muslims also hampers ethnic solidarity. While Sunnis are accorded "full respect" in the Iranian constitution, in practice and through social exclusion, Iranian Sunnis suffer discrimination. The Iranian government has barred the construction of a Sunni mosque in Tehran, and has moderately restricted public displays of the Sunni religion and culture (CULPO104-06= 2). Arabs, Shi’a and Sunni, face restrictions on use of and instruction in Arabic language (CULPO204-06 = 2). While the moderate regime of Khatami had put into place some remedial policies for the Arab population (POLDIS01-05 = 1), these were removed under Ahmadinejad. Following mass protests in 2005 and 2006, Arabs have faced generally repressive policies placed on the entire population (POLDIS05-06 = 4), including confiscation of land (ECDIS05-06 = 4). Arab grievances include a desire for independence among some Shi’a Arabs in Khuzestan (POLGR04-06 = 4). Additionally, as Khuzestan is the most oil-rich province of Iran, Arabs desire greater control over and benefits from these resources (ECGR04-06 = 2). Finally, Arabs desire the end of language and religious discrimination (CULGR04-06 = 1). The Arab Political Cultural Organization (APCO) was formed in 1979. It requested some concessions in April 1979 and was given the green light to form a provincial council with limited autonomy. Unrest occurred afterwards due to the presence of Revolutionary Guards, especially in the Khuzestani city of Khorramshahr. The unrest continued and escalated when the Arabs started bombing oil refineries and pipelines on "Black Wednesday" June 14, 1979. On April 30, 1980, they seized the Iranian embassy in London in order to free 91 Arabs imprisoned in Iran. The Arabs continued both their nonviolent and violent behavior in the b