prohairesis

Prohairesis or proairesis (; variously translated as "moral character", "will", "volition", "choice", "intention", or "moral choice") is a fundamental concept in the Stoic philosophy of Epictetus. It represents the choice involved in giving or withholding assent to impressions (phantasiai). The use of this Greek word was first introduced into philosophy by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. To Epictetus, it is the faculty that distinguishes human beings from all other creatures. The concept of prohairesis plays a cardinal role in the Discourses and in the Manual: the terms "prohairesis", "prohairetic", and "aprohairetic" appear some 168 times.

==Explanation by Epictetus== According to Epictetus, nothing is properly considered either good, or bad, aside from those things that are within our own power to control, and the only thing fully in our power to control is our own volition (prohairesis) which exercises the faculty of choice that we use to judge our impressions. For example, if a person says something critical to us, that is not bad; or, if something complimentary is said, that is not good, because such things are externals and not in our power to control. By exerting the power of choice, it is possible to maintain equanimity in the face of either criticism and praise, which is a moral good. On the other hand, when people become troubled by criticism, or elated by praise, that is a moral evil because they have misjudged impressions by thinking that things not in their power (such as criticism or praise) have value, and by doing that they place a measure of control of their own life in the hands of others.