qualia
Sign in to saveupright=0.65|thumb|The "redness" of red is an example of a quale.
Article
36 sectionsContents
- Definitions
- Arguments regarding the existence of qualia
- Modern philosophy
- Inverted spectrum argument
- Analytic philosophy
- "What's it like to be?" argument
- Zombie argument
- Explanatory gap argument
- Knowledge argument
- Proponents of qualia
- Analytic philosophy
- David Chalmers
- Christian List
- E. J. Lowe
- J. B. Maund
- Moreland Perkins
- Howard Robinson and William Robinson
- Neuroscience
- Gerald Edelman
- Antonio Damasio
- Rodolfo Llinás
- Vilayanur Ramachandran
- Critics of qualia
- Daniel Dennett
- Paul Churchland
- Gary Drescher
- David Lewis
- Marvin Minsky
- David Papineau
- Richard Rorty
- Roger Scruton
- Michael Tye
- See also
- References
- Citations
- Other references
upright=0.65|thumb|The "redness" of red is an example of a quale.
In philosophy of mind, qualia (; singular: quale ) are defined as instances of subjective experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis () meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in relation to a specific instance, such as "what it is like to taste a specific this particular apple now".